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Royal Society of New Zealand Submission Part B, covering the social sciences in New Zealand

    Submission Executive Summary

  1. The Royal Society of New Zealand is a statutory body, charged, among other things, with the promotion of science and technology, the formulation of codes of ethics for practitioners of science and technology, and the provision of advice on scientific matters to the Government and to the public.
  2. The Society is principally a federation of scientific societies, including local branches of the Royal Society, which together account for some 20,000 members, comprising 53 Constituent Organisations, 9 Branches and 8 Affiliate Organisations. It also has within its structure an Academy, governed by its own Council, with a membership of 273 Fellows of the Royal Society of New Zealand, elected in recognition of their distinguished research contribution and international standing in the sciences.
  3. In preparing this submission the Society canvassed the opinion and comments of the appropriate member societies and of the Academy. This submission therefore represents a consensus view of many practising scientists and members of the community with an interest in science. Understandably there was some disparity, both of perception and opinion, between the views expressed by the experimental biological scientists and the social scientists. Because these viewpoints formed separate coherent wholes, and because there was a strong desire to represent our views to the Commission as clearly and concisely as possible, the submission is presented in two parts. This is Part B, representing the views of the social scientists.
  4. This submission was prepared by:
    • Dr Fiona Cram, Tumuaki Rangahau, International Research Institute for Maori and Indigenous Education (IRI), University of Auckland
    • Dr Hugh Campbell, Senior Lecturer in Social Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, University of Otago
    • Dr Ruth Fitzgerald, Post Doctoral Fellow, Department of Anthropology, University of Otago
    • Dr Kevin Dew, Department of Public Health, Wellington School of Medicine
    • Bevan Tipene-Matua, Maori Department, University of Canterbury
    • Dr Keiko Tanaka, Department of Sociology, University of Canterbury.
  5. We begin by looking at the effect that negative consumer reaction is likely to have on the global marketplace, and at the socioeconomic effects on future GM uses, including the complexity of determining whether gains are likely and who is likely to reap the benefits (B(b)).
  6. In looking at the kinds of risk analysis often used, and their limitations, we conclude that a cautious use of temporarily restrictive measures against commercial GMOs would still allow the nation to maintain the technical capability for GM research (B(c)). The most likely beneficiaries of such research are the technology-provider sector and the science providers to this technology. In the short term, advantages to primary producers and consumers will probably be small. The groups most likely to be disadvantaged by GM use are Maori and non-GM commercial food producers, and (in the absence of a comprehensive labelling scheme) disaffected consumers of GM food . There is also the potential for New Zealand's `clean green' image to be damaged by GM production, thereby impacting on the primary produce sector generally (B(cii)).
  7. New Zealand's attitude to GM is complicated by various obligations, including the agreement whereby signatory nations cannot set standards and regulations to protect their own domestic industries. But given the direction of consumer reaction, to continue with a cautious approach may be the best option. New Zealand also has legal obligations with respect to biodiversity and indigenous peoples. If there are adverse effects of the release of GMOs, who should be blamed and what form should compensation take? One possibility includes internalising the mechanism, whereby the costs of the effects of product development are borne by the developers, not the community (B(e)).
  8. In New Zealand's case, a commitment to protecting the interests of indigenous peoples includes a consideration of Maori intellectual property rights (B(f)), and discussion of the concepts that are fundamental to Maori thinking about the world, including mauri, whakapapa and kaitiakitanga, and how these affect the Crown's responsibility to tangata whenua under the Treaty of Waitangi (B(g)).
  9. The main global developments affecting New Zealand's involvement with GM are the split in the global food market, international consumer reaction to GM foods, and the emergence of `green protectionism' (B(h)). The growth in the use of `green' production techniques in horticulture, such as organic and integrated pest management systems, has shown that there is an important niche market for `green' foods. This market would be jeopardised by the introduction of GMOs in primary production (B(i)).
  10. There could be health risks from GM foods, and the way in which safety testing is monitored and assessed needs to be more investigative. Nutriceuticals need to be carefully regulated, bearing in mind that they are delivery mechanisms for medicines (B(ji)). The potential impact of GM production on ecosystems is significant. While GM is in some ways a novel technology, institutionally it is equivalent to previous agrifood technologies that led to decline in the health of ecosystems. This is largely because the institutional arrangements through which GM technology is developed and introduced are no different from those that accelerated capital-intensive agrifood production. (B(jii)).
  11. Preliminary findings from trade model simulations suggest that economic returns from GM would not be favourable to New Zealand. In this context, the emergence of alternative agricultural strategies in food export industries, and in the alternative agricultural movement more generally, is significant (B(jiii)).
  12. The principal conclusion reached in terms of strategic options is that there may be little to lose economically and much to gain from a moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs in land-based production. New Zealand could benefit from a moratorium by (a) closely monitoring the success or otherwise of GM production in other countries, and (b) using the time to develop institutional mechanisms by which diverse groups of people could be regularly brought together to share their concerns and incorporate those concerns into their own activities.
  13. The recommended legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives discussed focus on:
    • considering the pros and cons of delaying the commercial release of GMOs in food, fibre and nutriceutical production by land-based industries
    • ensuring responsible and ethical behaviour on the part of producers and researchers
    • having appropriate procedures in place to deal with nutriceuticals
    • encouraging community participation in decision-making
    • encouraging the establishment of international bodies to oversee biotechnology issues.
  14. While some sections of the public recognise the potential benefits of GM as a technical tool, others are becoming increasingly critical of how this new technology is being developed, regulated and introduced. In this submission we argue that the development of modern biotechnology, including GM, has challenged us to re-evaluate the institutional processes and mechanisms that organise science and link it with commercial enterprises (for example, agrifood companies, pharmaceutical companies), educational institutions, government authorities and laypeople. Pressures on scientists to seek commercial funding for research have challenged the location of science as a public good. We provide a case for scientific research as a public good and for public participation in discussion about the cultural and ethical issues associated with scientific research.

    Witness Briefs Attached

    1. Rosemary Du Plessis, Sociology Department, University of Canterbury Submission by Section (as specified in the matters set out in the Warrant)

    Submission by Section

    Section A Recommendations

    Section A (1)

    A (1) the strategic options available to enable New Zealand to address, now and in the future, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section A (1) Summary

  15. The primary strategic option discussed in Submission Part B is to delay the commercial release of GMOs in land-based production in order to avoid the risks (including economic) currently associated with production of GM food, fibre and nutriceuticals. This needs to be distinguished from the regulation of GM research in containment and partial containment, which is covered extensively in Submission A. The opportunities presented by such a delay, in terms of the regulations and institutional arrangements that could be set up, are discussed in Section A2.

    A (1)

  16. Current economic analysis (CSAFE 2000:16-20) of the potential deployment of GMOs in commercial land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals suggests that there may be benefits if New Zealand delays a decision on commercial release. The first wave of GM food products are performing poorly in global markets and are unlikely to improve in the medium term. The development trajectory of commercial quantities of potentially consumer-friendly GM products will take many years (and even then are not certain to deliver strong economic benefits). A delay on commercial release in food, fibre and nutriceuticals would enable a more coherent economic picture of global markets to be compiled. At the same time, other countries would bear the economic and environmental risks of the broad release of GMOs during a time when New Zealand would not forfeit any economic advantages. The most likely sector to suffer economic constraints through such a delay would be that part of the science sector associated with technology provision to land-based production.

    Recommendation 1: Give serious consideration to placing a moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs in the land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals.

    Section A (2)

    A (2) any changes considered desirable to the current legislative, regulatory, policy, or institutional arrangements for addressing, in New Zealand, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section A (2) Summary

  17. The Royal Society's Submission Part A gives a detailed discussion of problems with the current legislation, and looks closely at the legislative and regulatory changes needed to address these problems. Submission Part B concentrates more on institutional, policy and regulatory changes, especially those resulting from the strategic option given in Section A1. These cover the need to:
    • establish an ongoing institutional mechanism by means of which the diverse views on GM can be heard and acted on
    • decentralise some components of the decision-making processes to give a sense of more local control over GM applications
    • increase funding for research on the socieoeconomic impacts of GM
    • develop measures to ensure that nutriceuticals are treated as delivery mechanisms for medicines
    • encourage the establishment of international agencies and international agreements in relation to biotechnology generally.

    A (2)

  18. Section A1 recommends as a strategic option giving serious consideration to placing a moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs in the land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals. During any such delay, New Zealand would need to seize the opportunity to create an ongoing mechanism to address scientific and moral uncertainty in GM uses, through which diverse groups of people (for example, research scientists, farmers, medical researchers, health practitioners, environmentalists and other consumers) could be regularly brought together to share their concerns and incorporate those concerns into their own activities. Overall there need to be improvements in the way GM issues are discussed with citizens. This applies to the media, research institutions and the government.

    Recommendation 2: Establish an ongoing mechanism by which the diversity of views on GM issues can be presented and incorporated into the various activities associated with GM research.

    19. Developing institutional forms to try to deal with the ethical and compensatory issues relating to new technologies such as GM will not guarantee public acceptability. Research on risk perception has noted a gulf between expert views and the public. However, the issue of control can to some extent be built into institutional arrangements. Mechanisms for enhancing the public participation in institutional decision-making is one way of doing this. Allowing decision-making to take place at the local level instead of centralised in agencies like ERMA could be another way of empowering the community and providing them with input into the risk evaluation process

    Recommendation 3: Consider the decentralisation of some components of decision-making processes and monitoring procedures so that local communities are a part of these processes in relation to GM applications.

  19. New Zealand would also need to take the advantage provided by a moratorium on commercial release to monitor developments in other countries, and undertake ongoing research into the effects that GM use would have on this country.

    Recommendation 4: Increase Public Good Science Funding for evaluating the socioeconomic impact of the commercial production of GMOs and for facilitating consultation with key stakeholders (for example, scientists, producers, marketers, Maori and other consumer groups).

  20. The issue of responsible and ethical behaviour also needs to be addressed. An IBAC study found that many respondents wanted the development of moral and ethical leadership and debate in the arena of biotechnology, and argued that a legal and regulatory framework for biotechnology is required (Mackay 2000: 3). Respondents also criticised ERMA for `lacking teeth', or for being overly `pro-business'. Currently ERMA is empowered to ensure that GMOs released into the environment do not have significant adverse effects on ecosystems or people. Under the HSNO Act, territorial authorities are enforcement agencies, and the Ministry of Health acts as an enforcement agency where there are issues of public health. Careful consideration needs to be given to whether territorial authorities are in the best position to oversee research on GM in the agricultural area when commercial interests may influence the process. This has become a general problem in New Zealand, where much contestable funding is `outcome-focused', so that even Crown Research Institutes are influenced by a commercial imperative.
  21. As a small nation, New Zealand can do little to influence world events on its own, and biotechnological development is an international issue. In this light New Zealand should take a leading role in lobbying for the establishment of an international agency that can deal with more global issues, such as has occurred with climate change.

    Recommendation 5: New Zealand should consider regulations and legislation at both the national and international level.

  22. Nutriceuticals form a separate issue, the main area of concern being the need to treat them as delivery agents for medicines, not as food.

    Recommendation 6: Appropriate measures are needed to ensure that nutriceuticals are treated as delivery mechanisms for medicines. Legislation relating to prescription medicines should incorporate nutriceuticals.

    Section B Relevant Matters

    The Warrant has set the Commission the task of receiving representations upon, inquiring into, and investigating, the matters set out in Section B (a) - (n) below

    Section B (b)

    B (b) the evidence (including the scientific evidence), and the level of uncertainty, about the present and possible future use, in New Zealand, of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (b) Summary

  23. Because the future use of GM products will be heavily influenced by public perception, this section looks at how the public views GM applications and whether they see some uses as `better' than others. We also look at the socioeconomic effects of future GM uses, including the complexity of determining whether gains are likely and who is likely to reap the benefits. We conclude that it is uncertain whether deploying GMOs in land-based production would provide a useful economic development strategy for New Zealand agriculture, given the high level of uncertainty over the ability of GM technologies to deliver returns to primary producers in the current global economic climate.

    B (b) Public uncertainty

  24. Even strong industry proponents of biotechnology have concluded that the degree to which society accepts biotechnology will shape the range of applications developed. A survey of the literature on public perceptions of biotechnology (CSAFE 2000) indicates that:
    • large-scale acceptance of the technology by the public is diminishing
    • there is a differential acceptance towards specific applications (this has been consistently evident from 1994)
    • there are broad regional variations in people's perceptions, with Europeans being the most and North Americans the least negatively disposed to the technology
    • people mistrust a variety of information sources on the subject (Zechendorf 1994; Norton 1998; Kamaldeen and Powell 2000; Cook et al 2000; INRA (Europe)-ECOSA (2000).[1]
  25. Indigenous peoples and local communities (particularly non-industrialised nations) have consistently articulated strong concerns about biotechnology and the potential for their genetic resources to be misappropriated and global socioeconomic inequities accentuated.
  26. In general, however, we need to be cautious of the assumption that there is a generic `consumer' out there waiting to be polled or questioned on this issue (Murcott 1999; Gofton 1998). The idea of a `consumer' of biotechnologies assumes a division between expert and lay knowledge, with the legitimacy of knowledge and experience weighted in favour of the expert. Yet this distinction is not sustained in practical interactions with the technologies - even experts `consume' GM food, for example. Any discussions of `consumer' responses to these issues should therefore remain sensitive to this artificial distinction.

    Socioeconomic uncertainty

  27. The second area of uncertainty is the economic and social effects of deploying GMOs in commercial production by land-based industries in New Zealand (see CSAFE 2000). (It is assumed in this discussion that the majority of commercial applications in New Zealand would involve the land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals.) While many claims are made about the possible economic benefits of deploying novel GMOs in commercial production, several issues indicate a high degree of uncertainty about the eventual economic outcomes.
  28. Sociological and economic studies of agricultural development strategies suggest that a significant `reality gap' exists between the abstract claims made about potential novel technologies and the actual outcomes in complex social and economic locales. Other novel technologies being deployed in New Zealand land-based production have economic outcomes that are only predictable from a complex analysis of a large number factors and sites within production, distribution and consumption systems (Campbell 2000 b, c; Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000).
  29. Preliminary investigation of the economic and social consequences of GMO deployment in land-based production in Australia, the United States and New Zealand confirms that there is a high level of uncertainty as to whether such technologies can actually deliver positive economic and social outcomes for primary producers (CSAFE 2000). The most certain outcome is that the principal economic benefits would accrue to the technology-provider industries and related science institutions.
  30. It is unlikely that this would provide a useful economic development strategy for New Zealand agriculture (at least in the next three years), given the high level of uncertainty over the ability of GM technologies to deliver returns to primary producers in the current global economic climate.
  31. These conclusions are drawn in the light of the most probable trade and market scenarios for GMOs in the current global market situation (see CSAFE 2000). A similar evaluation of the current trade situation for Australia (Foster 2000) also concluded that, `In the short run, at least... Australian grain growers are unlikely to be greatly disadvantaged by not having access to genetically modified grain crops, and may even profit'.

    Section B (c)

    B (c) the risks of, and the benefits to be derived from, the use or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand, including: (i) the groups of persons who are likely to be advantaged by each of those benefits (ii) the groups of persons who are likely to be disadvantaged by each of those risks

    Section B (c) Summary

  32. Most current analyses of risk adopt a technical approach, yet there are a variety of approaches to risk possible, each with different advantages and disadvantages. Here we point out some of the disadvantages of taking a purely technical approach.
  33. The most likely beneficiaries of GM use are the technology-provider sector and the science providers to GM technologies. Evidence suggests that, in the short term, advantages to primary producers and consumers will be small, both because of the small and variable impact of GM on crop production, and because only a small component of the retail price reflects the cost at the farm gate. Also, the advantages to New Zealand of benefits to the technology and science provider sectors are uncertain because of the internationalisation of biotechnology research and property rights.
  34. The groups most likely to be disadvantaged by GM use are Maori, as kaitiaki (guardians of the natural environment), non-GM commercial food producers and (in the absence of adequate labelling) disaffected consumers of GM food. There is also the potential for New Zealand's `clean green' image to be damaged by GM production, thereby impacting on the primary produce sector generally.

    B (c)

    Defining `risk'

  35. In discussing the concept of risk in relation to GMOs, it is important that a single definition of risk does not capture public debate to the exclusion of alternative interpretations. According to Renn (1992), risk analysis has developed a broad range of approaches, each of which is associated with a range of assumptions - and consequent benefits and drawbacks. Renn distinguishes technical, economic, psychological, social and cultural theories of risk. Here we will focus on the adequacy of utilising the technical risk approach, since many scientific discussions of the potential impact of GMOs on the environment are couched in these terms.
  36. Technical approaches to risk (for example, actuarial, epidemiological and probabilistic risk analyses) anticipate harm to the environment and/or people and seek to avoid or modify its cause(s). They talk about risk in the language of probabilities (averaged out in terms of time, space and relative frequency), and attempt to set standards and make improvements in associated safety systems. They are a popular response at a bureaucratic level to the containment of hazards, because the probability of physical harm may often be the only area on which groups can agree.
  37. While this is a pragmatic response, we need to consider how inclusive this approach actually is, particularly when the risk involves harms that are less tangible, less obvious and resist quantification. Renn (1992: 58-61) reviews the literature on technical risk assessment and makes the following criticisms of this approach:
    • What people view as an undesirable risk varies a good deal.
    • The complexity of the unintended consequences of human activities are poorly captured in these analyses.
    • Institutional procedures for managing these risks are themselves prone to failure, but these further risks are often excluded from this kind of analysis.
    • The similarity of risks as measured by their numerical weighting of magnitude and probability is not reflected in people's perceptions, where such risks may be rated very differently.
    • The approach divides the world into experts and laypeople.
    • It provides information about large segments of the population over long periods of time and so ignores the experience of individuals who face a very high risk of a negative occurrence, and also the local context of situations where people may mitigate aspects of risks by using local knowledge.
    • It suffers from transcientific assumptions (Weinberg 1972) by excluding social constructions of risk in favour of concentrating on physical harm.
  38. Any considered discussion of the risks associated with GMOs should therefore involve a much wider view of risk than technical risk alone. Also, the influence of culture on risk perceptions and the value-based assumptions that drive risk analysis need further examination. This involves attention to how tangata whenua perceptions of risk are influenced by factors such as socioeconomic status, colonial experiences, and moral or spiritual beliefs.

    B (c)(i)

    Groups advantaged

  39. Studies indicate that those most likely to benefit from adopting GMO technologies are the technology-provider sector and the science providers to this technology (CSAFE 2000). There are other potential beneficiaries, such as producers and consumers, but evidence suggests these benefits are small - if not non-existent in the current situation.
  40. The current benefits relate to improved production techniques, greater yields and lower costs. Evidence from the US shows that yields from GM crops have been variable (the exact levels are contested by various analysts) and net returns in the case of soybeans did not rise (returns from cotton did rise). This suggests that the benefits to producers are by no means certain and are likely to vary across commodities.
  41. Preliminary work in New Zealand (using a partial equilibrium model of trade) supports a cautious approach to predicting unambiguously positive results for primary producers. Benefits to consumers from the adoption of GM food in the form of lower prices are also uncertain. This is because of the small impact of GM use on producer costs, but also because only a small proportion of the price of a consumer food item represents the cost at the farm gate: most derives from the processing and marketing components.
  42. Consumer benefits have also been small in that, so far, the commercially released GM foods have no attributes that improve the perceived or actual quality of the food. Current levels of propagation and commercial development suggest a significant time lag before such products actually enter the marketplace and public responses can be evaluated.
  43. The two main beneficiaries in the current situation are therefore likely to be the developers of the new technologies and those who hold the property right to this technology. However, it is worth noting that there are risks associated with these benefits. Property rights are extremely mobile and difficult to monitor, and there are risks associated with both obtaining and maintaining the benefits of intellectual property associated with GM foods. A review by Lindener (2000) of the issues relating to intellectual property notes a number of concerns, including the difficulties of establishing a property right over new technology, which is costly and time-consuming given the potential backlog of patent applications around the world.
  44. Another benefit that includes a risk component risk has to do with the `brain drain'. New Zealand is experiencing a problem in maintaining and retaining scientists, especially those with commercial potential. It has been said that limitations on research into GM applications would see a worsening of this problem, yet the internationalised nature of the biotechnology sector suggests that these trends will intensify anyway as New Zealand becomes more integrated into this development sector.
  45. Consequently, it is possible that:
    • novel technologies will continue to be imported to New Zealand regardless of the activities of our local technological input industries
    • any industrial and scientific development of new intellectual property surrounding primary production will have few incentives to remain within New Zealand.
  46. In short, the intellectual property benefits of novel GMOs in industrial deployment are operating within a global market similar to that found in pharmaceuticals. Aside from the industry providers and science providers directly involved, the wider economic benefits are not country-specific (nor do they need to be developed in a country-specific manner), and would accrue to the global shareholding and global industry users. Thus the only direct economic benefits accruing to a New Zealand-based technology development sector would be to science providers and the primary production-inputs industry.

    B (c)(ii)

    Groups disadvantaged

  47. There are two main groups of people likely to be negatively affected by the risks associated with GM:
    • Maori, as tangata whenua, since they are constituted through custom as kaitiaki (guardians of the natural and physical environment)
    • groups involved in the commercial production of non-GM food.

    Disadvantages to Maori

  48. The experience of tangata whenua has been that they are the first to suffer adverse affects and the last to benefit from new technologies. Significant intervention is needed to ensure that the impacts of GM biotechnology do not mirror the experiences of other Western technologies on Maori, such as guns, alcohol, and tobacco.
  49. Nga Kaihautu Tikanga Taiao (the advisory committee to ERMA) argue that the potential for genetic manipulation to cause cultural offence is best articulated by individual hapu and iwi.[2] However, many of the issues raised by Maori making submissions to ERMA about local issues, and by Maori during Nga Kaihautu consultations, are seen by Nga Kaihautu to apply to Maori in a wider context and are not restricted to the potential risks and impacts at a local level. These include:
    • cultural offence: the mixing of genes between species is an affront to the mauri inherent in whakapapa (a detailed discussion of mauri and whakapapa is given in Section B (g))
    • Maori health risks related to imbalances between metaphysical and physical states (taha hinengaro, taha wairua, taha tinana, taha whanau), where any species has been interfered with in a way that is inconsistent with tikanga
    • the potential for transgenic material to enter the food chain
    • the potential for negative impact on Maori economic interests (for example, through a negative impact on beef export markets).[3]
  50. When Angeline Greensill[4] became the first Maori to make a submission to ERMA under the HSNO Act, she articulated the clash between transgenic manipulation and her world view:

    Our world has domains which are governed by gods or atua... if the gods can't do it, why are we trying? Humans are one of the youngest species on this Earth - we do not have the right to dominate our elders.[5]

  51. Rooted in an alternative view of the planet, indigenous peoples have been critics of GM. Maori communities will possibly suffer any adverse environmental or human health affects first, and sustained breaches of tikanga Maori have the potential to cause significant long-term impacts on Maori world views and traditions.

    Disadvantages to non-GM industries

  52. There are a variety of potential disadvantages for industries that do not employ GM technologies but operate in an environment in which they are used by other producers. Those likely to be affected are:
    • industries involved in the organic and integrated pest management (IPM) production of foods, where pollen pollution, reduced effectiveness of pest-control strategies and increased compliance and/or testing costs will lead to reduced economic performance (Campbell 2000a, b, c)
    • industries that do not deploy GMOs, which may experience reduced producer control over intellectual property and other aspects of on-farm production (Goodman et al. 1987).
  53. However, it can be argued that there is a much wider risk to the food sector overall in New Zealand from the growing international preference for GM-free products. Already there is trade diversion away from countries producing GM food to those that do not, such as a rise in GM-free imports into Japan from the EU and Australia, thereby avoiding the US. Also, many of the main markets for New Zealand products are stating that GM food, or even animal products using GM feed, is not acceptable (See CSAFE 2000:19, Box 4 for a list of countries that currently ban GM foods).
  54. Unlike many continental countries, New Zealand's position of being an island nation means it does not have the potential for cross-pollination from GM crops, and therefore can choose to maintain a GM-free status. Even countries like the UK have problems of cross-pollination of rapeseed and other crops. New Zealand is therefore uniquely placed to take advantage of any preference switching towards GM free. The risk of losing this status is an important consideration given New Zealand's need to target high-value developed markets.
  55. More generally, New Zealand has been successful in developing a marketing strategy of `clean and green' in international markets, enabling this country to target, maintain and grow market share. The production of GM food, given current attitudes, may well not be compatible with these markets and this image.

    Section B (d)

    B (d) the international legal obligations of New Zealand in relation to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (d) Summary

  56. Under international agreements, signatory nations cannot set standards and regulations to protect their own domestic industries. However, a number of First World countries have been adopting the `precautionary principle' with respect to food and environmental safety, which effectively reintroduces trade barriers (for example, to GM products). This could seriously influence the future marketability of GM goods. New Zealand also has legal obligations with respect to the UN Convention of Biological Diversity Convention, and to protect the interests of indigenous peoples.

    B (d)

  57. Since the completion of the Uruguay Round Agricultural Agreement and the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a number of issues have been raised relating to GMOs. These issues concern the impact of GM on agrifood trade, environmental protection and food safety.
  58. Under the agreement to reduce technical barriers to trade (TBT) and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, signatory nations cannot set product standards and technical regulations as means to protect their own domestic industries. The SPS agreement stresses equivalence, harmonisation, transparency and consistency among any standards and regulations enacted by signatory nations for assessing products for `the fitness of intended purposes'. Those standards and regulations must be based on scientific or technical information, and cannot be unnecessarily restrictive (or `technical barriers') to trade.
  59. However, national differences in how the GM food debate has been handled exemplify contradictions in the WTO framework. Major First World nations have been increasingly adopting the `precautionary principle' in relation to the environmental and food safety attributes of imports. Meanwhile, many Third World nations lack effective regulatory mechanisms for environmental and food safety to ensure that their products meet international standards. As a result, the effort to harmonise agrifood standards has, in reality, consolidated and legitimised trade barriers that have existed for centuries between the First and Third Worlds.
  60. Convention provides for national legislation to prevail over international agreements. However, it remains unclear what impact agreements such as the SPS agreement will have on provisions in domestic legislation that recognise and provide for the socio-cultural wellbeing of communities and the values of tangata whenua. For example, sections 5(b), 6(d) and 8 of the HSNO legislation require decision-makers to take into account socio-cultural values that do not fall into the `scientific or technical information' required by the SPS agreement.
  61. In Europe, Japan and New Zealand some barriers have already been erected against GM food imports. The US may condemn such measures as a violation of the TBT agreement, as shown in Carol Moseley Braun's recent lecture at the University of Canterbury. However, the rise of public concerns over GM food (for example, massive food recall by Taco Bell) in the US is likely to undermine such a claim.
  62. Another significant implication of GM relates to New Zealand's legal obligation to the UN Convention of Biological Diversity Convention (see Department of Conservation and Ministry for the Environment 2000). As argued by various authors, intellectual property rights, inherent in the development of modern biotechnology, may have the effect of hindering efforts for sustainable development in the Third World (Busch et al. 1991; Goodman et al. 1987; Goodman and Redclift 1991 a; Kloppenburg 1988; Nottingham 1998; Shiva 1997). They may also threaten biological diversity.
  63. It is important that decision-makers be reminded that our international legal obligations extend beyond free-trade agreements. For example, Article 8(j) requires signatories to respect, preserve and maintain knowledge and innovations and practices of indigenous communities and encourage the equitable sharing of any benefits.

    Section B (e)

    B (e) the liability issues involved, or likely to be involved, now or in the future, in relation to the use, in New Zealand, of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (e) Summary

  64. If there are adverse effects of the release of GMOs, who should be blamed and what form should compensation take? One problem is the difficulty of establishing a link between an adverse effect and its cause, which can drastically tip the scales in favour of those introducing new products. Possibilities for regulation include requiring those who develop GM products to perform and publicise adequate safety tests, and/or to maximise penalties to ensure compensation for victims of adverse effects. In economic terms this is known as internalisation, where the costs of the effects of product development are borne by the developers, not the community.

    B (e)

  65. Liability issues involve compensation where there is judged to be some adverse impact from research or commercial releases of GM products. Epidemiological research on such adverse effects may be of limited value when it can take many years before effects become statistically significant, and where symptoms may relate to a number of possible diseases (Dew 1999). The burden of proof in identifying a particular agent as causal is extremely one-sided (Beck 1995: 3), which allows for an increase in hazards as those resisting the introduction and use of hazardous technologies find the burden of proof an insurmountable obstacle.
  66. Beck argues that this amounts to organised irresponsibility. That is, as science cannot establish standards of proof on which policy decisions can be based, and as by law one can only intervene when one has established the individual causal agent, then this protects the perpetrators of the responsibility for any untoward impacts of their products. The same burden of proof is faced by those seeking compensation for adverse health impacts.
  67. Careful thought needs to be given to developing institutional responses to cases where there is dispute over the possible adverse effects on human health from GM. The assessment of such procedures must not give too much weight to the concern to avoid false positives, as has been the case with some instances of chemical contamination in New Zealand (Dew 1999).
  68. Related to this is the need to ensure that mechanisms exist so that commercial interests put in place all possible safety tests - and declare the results - before the release of commercial products. The current New Zealand no-fault insurance scheme does not suit this situation. One possibility is to maximise penalties in terms of product liability, so that those who suffer the consequences of any adverse event receive full compensation. In other words, the risks of adverse outcomes would not be carried by the New Zealand public, but by those who gain from product development.
  69. In economic terms this is known as internalisation, where the costs of the effects of product development must be borne by the developers - not the community. The potential costs of releasing harmful products must be prohibitively high. At one level this may discourage some commercial interests from engaging in the release of products in New Zealand, but this must be weighed against the public distrust of the science of commercial companies and the potential for uncontrollable outcomes from product release.
  70. There is, then, an argument that commercial interests carry the cost of compensation, and that the link between ACC and any other compensation arrangement should be clearly articulated. This may entail exploring various mechanisms, such as the companies involved in GM contributing to an indemnity fund (Mackay et al. 2000: 27).
  71. One argument against this sort of intensive regulation and legislation is that it will infringe on the individual liberties of farmers who want to gain a competitive advantage by using GM products. However, given the `unknowns' surrounding GM, it seems only just that those who are not gaining financially from the products are protected from any possible adverse events. Further, economic analyses of the uncertainties over potential financial returns to farmers suggest that it is unclear whether any restrictive regulation would, in fact, be preventing farmers from earning extra profits. Given that some economists are suggesting a greater return to science providers and technology industries than primary producers themselves, such arguments would strengthen the grounds for internalisation.

    Section B (f)

    B (f) the intellectual property issues involved, or likely to be involved, now or in the future, in relation to the use in New Zealand of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (f) Summary

  72. This section focuses on the intellectual property rights issues associated with the Treaty of Waitangi and issues for Maori as tangata whenua. The rights of indigenous peoples to control and benefit from their own intellectual property is examined in the light of the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights.

    B (f)

  73. In the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples,[6] the following recommendations are made to states, and national and international agencies:

    2.1 Recognise that indigenous peoples are the guardians of their customary knowledge and have the right to protect and control dissemination of that knowledge.

    2.2. Recognise that indigenous peoples also have the right to create new knowledge based on cultural traditions.

  74. From her examination of national and international agreements, including the Mataatua Declaration (Mead 1996), Aroha Mead has identified a minimum set of guidelines for protecting the cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples. These include:
    • developing a code of ethics for collecting and using indigenous `information'
    • ensuring that the maximum standards of free and informed consent are obtained from indigenous informants
    • sharing any financial benefits.
  75. As part of her work with Te Puni Kokiri (Ministry of Maori Affairs), Mead has worked to transform the guidelines and recommendations within the Mataatua Declaration into legislative initiatives that will protect Maori heritage. The Declaration is very clear about what is required in relation to biodiversity and customary environmental management:

    2.8 A moratorium on any further commercialisation of indigenous medicinal plants and human genetic material must be declared until indigenous communities have developed appropriate protection mechanisms.

    2.9 Companies, institutions both governmental and private, must not undertake experiments or commercialisation of any biogenic resources without the consent of the appropriate indigenous peoples.

  76. 2.10 Ensure current scientific environmental research is strengthened by increasing the involvement of indigenous communities and of customary environmental knowledge.

  77. In 1991 the Wai 262 Indigenous Flora and Fauna Claim was lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal and is still being heard. Within this claim is the call to have `the right to participate in, benefit from and make decisions about the application of existing and future technological advances as they relate to the breeding, genetic manipulation and other processes relevant to the use of indigenous flora and fauna'.
  78. Wai 262 seeks `to re-establish te Tino Rangatiratanga in respect of the knowledge of native plants and animals and cultural taonga', which was traditionally maintained by the iwi and whose ownership is affirmed by the Treaty of Waitangi. The Wai 262 claim relates to New Zealand's biodiversity, `particularly rights in the knowledge and uses of Indigenous flora and fauna, such as breeding, genetic manipulation, study, and local or overseas sale and transportation'. This is an important case because it raises the issue of the importance of the respect of all traditional Maori knowledge and the need for active protection of that knowledge, and affirms Maori rights to absolute chieftainship over Maori knowledge and ways of doing things (Smith and Reynolds 2000).
  79. In 1995 the Health Research Council held a Consensus Development Conference on human genetic information and subsequently published a conference report, Whose Genes Are They Anyway? (Baird et al. 1995). The key questions asked at the conference were:
    • Who should have the right to know genetic information?
    • What criteria should be used for genetic testing?
    • What ethical and legal controls do we need?
  80. During the conference Maori stated quite specifically that Maori genetic information is owned by whanau, hapu and iwi. There are substantive issues about whether scientific views of genetic information are relevant to Maori, who already map their being through whakapapa, which can never be alienated. This implies that no one except whanau, hapu and iwi have the right to know genetic information unless with express permission, agreement and management of access by Maori themselves (Baird et al. 1995: 4) Yet Health Research Council Guidelines for Researchers on Health Research Involving Maori[7] state that:

    As a general rule, consultation should take place if Maori are to be involved as participants in a project or the project relates to a health issue of importance to Maori.

    Therefore the issue of consultation is unlikely to be relevant to most biological laboratory-based studies unless the results could be useful in addressing a Maori health issue. Clinical and public health research are more likely to require some degree of consultation.

    Section B (g)

    B (g) the Crown's responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi in relation to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (g) Summary

  81. This section examines the way in which concepts fundamental to Maori thinking about the world, including mauri, whakapapa and kaitiakitanga, affect the Crown's responsibility to tangata whenua under the Treaty of Waitangi. Basically, GM research impacts on Maori thinking in three ways:
    • all elements of the natural and divine worlds, including humans and genetic material, are related and are linked by the possession of mauri (the life force)
    • it is the responsibility of the present generation, as kaitiaki, to protect the mauri of genetic material from defilement or abuse
    • genetic manipulation may be seen to interfere with the integrity of species and, therefore, may interfere with the mauri of the affected species.

    B (g)

    Te Tiriti o Waitangi

  82. According to Aroha Mead, Maori:

    ... found the concept of sharing these lands and resources quite acceptable, as long as there existed a constitutional code to articulate rights and responsibilities, regulate behaviours, and accommodate access rights of settlers without compromising the guardianship/ownership rights of Maori. This code created the country that has since become the Treaty of Waitangi nation Aotearoa New Zealand (Mead 1999).

  83. Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Treaty are relevant to GM: Article 1 relates to good governance, Article 2 to tino rangatiratanga, and Article 3 to equality and equity between Maori and other New Zealanders:
  84. Maori seek to exercise te tino rangatiratanga as guaranteed to them by Article II of the Treaty. Te tino rangatiratanga reflects the status of Maori as tangata whenua and gives rise to rights of self-determination and tribal self-development. Rangatiratanga incorporates rights and responsibilities to make decisions on the use, control and protection of natural resources according to Maori cultural values and customary practices. There are other rights encapsulated in the Treaty which Maori may also seek to raise, including oritetanga (equitable treatment of interests) under Article III (Ministry of Commerce 1999).

  85. Thus the Treaty contains the promises of protection, participation and partnership. Perhaps the most controversial is the promise of rangatiratanga; that is, Maori self-determination. According to Greensill:

    Since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori have been consistent in their efforts to protect those rights guaranteed in that contract. Despite our best efforts we continue to exert our Treaty rights, which in the current situation [of genetic engineering] includes saying no to the inappropriate use of Maori cultural and intellectual property for someone else's benefit and commercial gain. This has also been the experience of other indigenous peoples (Greensill 1999).

    Cultural values

  86. At least three key Maori concepts are relevant to the discussion of genetic engineering:
    • all elements of the natural and divine worlds, including humans and genetic material, are related and are linked by the possession of mauri (the life force)
    • it is the responsibility of the present generation, as kaitiaki, to protect the mauri of genetic material from defilement or abuse
    • genetic manipulation may be seen to interfere with the integrity of species and, therefore, may interfere with the mauri of the affected species (cited in Simpson and Browne 1999). [8]

    Mauri

  87. Several writers have discussed mauri:

    Mauri is a special power possessed by Io which makes it possible for everything to move and live in accordance with the conditions and limits of its existence. Everything has a Mauri, including people, fish, animals, birds, forests, land, seas, rivers; the Mauri is the power which permits these living things to exist within their own realm and sphere. No one can control their own Mauri or life-essence. When a person is born, the gods bind the two parts of body and spirit of his being together. Only the Mauri or power of Io can join them together (Barlow 1991).

    Mauri (the physical life force) is one of the fundamental spiritual concepts which permeates all relationships Maori have with each other and with the natural world. In the traditional Maori view, everything in the natural world possesses Mauri, including all people, plants, animals, genetic material, and physical entities such as lakes, rivers and rocks. Humans possess Mauri-ora, which is of a higher order than Mauri, but confers on humans a certain responsibility towards other aspects of the environment. (Gibbs 1998).

  88. Submissions to ERMA opposing applications for field trials of GMOs also stress the importance of mauri:

    For us, any imposed action of genetic modification on mauri is culturally abhorrent. Genetic changes that may arise through mutation or cross-pollination are actions of nature, within our understanding of continuing creation.[9]

    Manipulating cow and human genes to maybe improve the quality of milk shows a lack of understanding about maintaining the balance of the mauri of each of these species and shows also a lack of respect for the spiritual, cultural and traditional values of Maori people and for the environment as a whole.[10]

    Whakapapa

  89. These are some of the statements that have been made about whakapapa:

    Whakapapa is the genealogical descent of all living things from the gods to the present time. The meaning of Whakapapa is to lay one thing upon another as, for example, to lay one generation upon another. Everything has a Whakapapa: birds, fish, animals, trees, and every other living thing; soil and rocks and mountains also have a Whakapapa. (Barlow 1991).

    It is clear, therefore, that genetic manipulation of the human genome may be seen by Maori as interference with the basic structure of relationships between generations and between species, which is central to both the practical and spiritual aspects of Maori life (Gibbs 1998).

    One of the loudest arguments against genetics and biotechnology is coming from our own Kaumatua, who are saying very clearly that no one should corrupt or interfere with whakapapa. The sanctity and respect for whakapapa is to be maintained. Both mauri (life principle) and wairua (spirit) of living things are sacred. The responsibility falls on us to protect the legacy of our future generations and this includes the guardianship of whakapapa. (Smith and Reynolds 2000).

  90. Kaitiakitanga

  91. The Resource Management Act 1991 defines kaitiakitanga as the exercise of guardianship by the tangata whenua of an area in accordance with tikanga Maori in relation to natural and physical resources, and includes the ethic of stewardship based on the nature of the resource itself. Maori have practised kaitiakitanga for hundreds of years and thereby protected and cared for their environment and heritage. The purpose behind the practice was to ensure the protection of the mauri or life force of all things inanimate or animate. Strict rules or tikanga, which included the use of rahui and tapu at appropriate times, helped prevent adverse effects on the people and the places.[11]

    The most fundamental concern for Mäori is to maintain the exclusive `guardianship' rights and responsibilities of individuals to ensure the `safety' of and non-interference with their multigenerational whakapapa. (Mead 1997).

  92. Ngati Wairere, for example, are clear that their rangatiratanga status means that they will make decisions about field trials of GMOs within their rohe. It is not acceptable to establish a precedent based on another whanau, hapu or iwi decision, just as it is not acceptable to use decisions by Ngati Wairere as precedents for other whanau, hapu and iwi.[12] Greensill[13] also argues that `Whilst recognising tangata whenua, we also have to extend our manaakitanga responsibilities by including all New Zealanders in [the consultation] process as all will be affected by the outcome.'
  93. The development of kaitiakitanga requires informed discussion and debate that is not often possible within the timeframes required, for example, to respond to an application to ERMA.[14] The moratorium on GM foods and GMOs while a Royal Commission is conducted potentially allows this discussion and debate to occur.

    Tangata whenua interests in indigenous flora and fauna

  94. Current legislation (section 6(d) HSNO Act) and policy prescriptions recognise the unique relationship between Maori and indigenous flora and fauna, and the Waitangi Tribunal is currently undertaking to define the nature and extent of this interest. However, under the HSNO legislation most approvals to conduct gene sequencing of indigenous species are given by local institutional biological safety committees (IBSCs) under delegated authority from ERMA, as such experiments are deemed to be `low risk'. While it may be true that such applications pose low technical or tangible risks to people or the environment, the potential for `cultural risk' may be significant. This is potentially a breach of the obligation on the Crown to actively protect Maori and their taonga.

    Section B (h)

    B (h) the global developments and issues that may influence the manner in which New Zealand may use, or limit the use of, genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (h) Summary

  95. The main global developments affecting New Zealand's involvement with GM are:
    • the split in the global food market
    • international consumer reaction to GM foods
    • the emergence of `green protectionism'.

    B (h)

  96. CSAFE (2000) outlines the possible global economic, trade and social developments that may limit the use and value of GMOs in the primary production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals. The following is a summary of issues discussed in detail in that paper. (These points are elaborated further in Section K).
  97. The global market for food is currently splitting in two, with bulk commodities providing inputs to processed foods while niche retail markets are increasingly auditing and demarcating products lines. It is unlikely that the valuable niche markets for food will open to GM product lines in the medium term. The prospects for GM food exports seem more viable in the lower-value bulk commodity trade.
  98. International consumer reaction to GM foods has not been positive, with a `food scare'[15] around GM foods increasing in momentum and being `locked in' through various social and legislative processes (CSAFE 2000). This suggests poor market prospects for GM foods.
  99. In international trading politics, GM foods have become incorporated into wider political agendas, particularly the emergence of `green protectionism' in the EU and Japan. The political forces behind moratoria and sanctions against GM products are unlikely to dissipate in the near term.

    Section B (i)

    B (i) the opportunities that may be open to New Zealand from the use or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (i) Summary

  100. The growth in the use of `green' production techniques in horticulture, such as organic and integrated pest management (IPM) systems, has shown that there is an important niche market for `green' foods. This market would be jeopardised by the introduction of GMOs in primary production.

    B (i)

  101. New Zealand horticulture has already embarked on a strategy for developing `environmental' food exports (CSAFE 2000; Campbell 2000a, b, c; Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000). This strategy is based on a `two-tier' system of peak organic product, and mainstream `residue-free' product operating under IPM systems (Campbell and Fairweather 1998). This strategy has already proved to have important environmental outcomes, and has been very successful in accessing valuable niche markets for `green' foods. Currently, over half of horticultural exports have been converted to either organic or IPM production, with the rest of the sector following this successful model.
  102. As outlined in Section B(c), there are potential negative consequences for these emerging strategies, both from direct influences in the orchard-level productivity of these `green' systems, and in the wider market image issues that would emerge after the first release of GMOs in primary production. However, the IBAC (1999) discussion paper suggests that restricting the analysis of potential benefits of GM-free food production to organic and IPM sectors is erroneous. In fact, market advantage through utilising GM-free labelling would have the most benefit for conventional food producers.

    Section B (j)

    B (j) the main areas of public interest in genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products, including those related to: (i) human health (including biomedical, food safety, and consumer choice) (ii) environmental matters (including biodiversity, biosecurity issues, and the health of ecosystems) (iii) economic matters (including research and innovation, business development, primary production, and exports) (iv) cultural and ethical concerns

    Section B (j) Summary

  103. The public's interest in GM has been affected by the tendency of scientists and policy-makers to regard the public and `laypeople' as being ignorant about scientific and technical issues. They are distinguished from `experts', who consequently are given more influence in the direction of research and development. We look at a number of problems with this distinction, and note that it fosters mistrust through a perceived lack of access to the `experts'.
  104. Surveys have shown that people tend to have a much higher approval of the use of GM in medicine as compared with food. From within the paradigm of psychosocial risk analysis, this is partly a matter of control: one can choose not to take certain medicines, but (in the absence of adequate labelling) one cannot choose to avoid GM foods. There is also a perception that whereas patients benefit from the use of GM medicine, trans-national corporations benefit from GM foods. There may also be health risks from GM foods, and nutriceuticals need to be carefully regulated (as medicinal agents, not food).
  105. The potential impact of GM production on ecosystems is huge. Here, GM technology seems no different from any previous agrifood technologies that led to decline in the health of ecosystems. This is largely because the institutional arrangements through which GM technology is developed and introduced are no different from those that accelerated capital-intensive agrifood production. Arguably, more appropriate management systems have the ability to out-perform high-cost biotechnologies Pretty (1999).
  106. The lack of GMOs in the marketplace makes it difficult to assess the market performance of real goods. Preliminary findings from simulation models suggest that economic returns would not be favourable to New Zealand. A considerable body of research has been conducted in New Zealand on the emergence of alternative agricultural strategies in food export industries, and in the alternative agricultural movement more generally. These are important for understanding the situation of GM food, as this social movement and related industries have provided an important base of resistance to the release of GMOs into agricultural production.

    Section B (j)

    Public interest in GM

  107. Scientists, policy-makers and industry representatives in New Zealand and abroad tend to blame `uninformed' citizens and `irresponsible' mass media for creating `public hysteria' over genetic engineering. `Consumers' are viewed in relation to an imagined `expert' group of scientists and perhaps business entrepreneurs - a distinction that assumes, in relation to GM food, that such individuals never eat.
  108. This implicit expert/lay divide goes some way towards explaining the ease with which `consumer' concerns are discounted in importance and assumed to result from lack of knowledge of the products/organisms involved (for example, studies by Hoban 1989, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999 a,b, 2000, nd a, nd b)) instead of becoming the focus of primary social science research itself (CSAFE 2000).
  109. The obvious solution, from this perspective, is to educate the uniformed consumer. But this `education model' has a number of problems (CSAFE 2000):
    • It construes `consumers' as passive or uncritical recipients of media information. In fact studies (for example, Fiske and Hartley 1978) have revealed that consumers develop their views based on critical interpretation of media texts.
    • Science-based education solutions propose too narrow an information base to be effective in public opinion-making. Such proposals also ignore the inability of science itself to respond to questions of morality, ethics and religious opinion, which concerns over the application of GM technologies inevitably raise. These issues arise from within the everyday pursuit of scientific endeavours, but pose questions that science no longer has the ability or legitimacy to answer.
    • Education programmes are directed towards the individual consumer, rather than engaging with broader social processes affecting attitude formation.
    • There is little or no empirical evidence to support the alleged bias in media coverage of biotechnology and its resulting effect on consumer perceptions, which education campaigns would supposedly correct (see Sivak et al. forthcoming 2000).
    • At least in the New Zealand context, the `most important' consumers of the agrifood sector reside outside New Zealand, beyond the reach of our education programmes.
  110. In addition, it is not clear that `laypeople' are always as uninformed as is often assumed. Cook et al (2000 a) have reviewed seven studies of public attitudes to GM in food production, carried out in New Zealand between 1990 and 2000 (including Gamble et al. 2000). According to this review, New Zealanders' knowledge of GM has increased over time, and the level of GM acceptance remained higher than in other areas of the world until 1998, when it began to diminish.

    Recent research (for example, Clarke 1990 and Irwin and Wynne 1996) suggests that patients often develop very sophisticated technical understandings of their own conditions, potential treatments and clinical practices with little or no background in science. Similarly, expert scientists often participate in environmental and consumer movements to justify and legitimate their claims against the use of GM in agrifood production.

  111. In the recent controversies about GM food, the monopoly on `knowing the truth' has widened beyond GM researchers and medical professionals to include other `experts' (for example, lawyers, ethicists, ecologists, sociologists) and spokespeople from the mass media, private companies (for example, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, food), political parties, churches, and consumer and community organisations. Attitudes toward particular products of science are often `the product of an elaborate, often heated, and, in some ways, quite peculiar complex interactions among these various players' (Epstein 1995). In short, we can no longer easily classify the role of `laypeople' or `the public' in GM controversies. As an editorial in Nature suggests, the `public of "public understanding" is probably much better informed about the parts of science that matter personally than the research community allows. It needs encouragement, not instruction' (Nature Editorial 1995: 295).
  112. This seems so obvious that it is easy to ignore its significance and implications. From the conception of a research project to the successful introduction of a product derived from that project, non-experts are rarely brought in for consultation. In fact, researchers in universities, medical schools and Crown Research Institutes have little contact with `laypeople' until a product from their research needs field trials or patient trials, and/or the media releases a report on the successful completion of their project. As food consumers, patients, residents and citizens, most people do not come in contact with GM products until they are ready to be used. Controversy about GM in various countries reflects people's discontent with the ways through which agrifood, medical, educational, research and regulatory systems are organised in their own country and globally.

    B (j)(i)

    Human health (including biomedical, food safety and consumer choices)

  113. Research has found that the public assess GM uses in medicine and GM uses in food differently (for example, Hamstra 1998; INRA (Europe)-ECOSA 2000). Early research (Zechendorf 1994) found that applications of GM for drug use were preferred over interference with food or animals. A major reason for this difference (according to psychosocial theories of risk perception) relates to an individual's control over the technology. In medical applications the patient can choose whether or not to use a GM-based treatment; with food, consumers may not be able to tell which products contain GMOs. We therefore support New Zealand's effort to label GM food and provide consumers with opportunities to choose their own food supplies. We recommend that the New Zealand government persuade other governments to follow suit.
  114. Another reason for the medicine/food difference relates to who is seen as benefiting from the technology. People tend to see big corporations as the main beneficiaries from food applications of GM, whereas patients are perceived as the beneficiaries of medical applications. Concerns over the powerful position of a few trans-national corporations in relation to GM food products has led to a more critical view of this type of application, and lends support to the current regulatory efforts to label GM food.
  115. Although people tend to support more medical than food applications of GM, this does not necessarily indicate that New Zealand should accelerate medical research on GM. The last Eurobarometer survey[16] showed that differential acceptance of GM applications was still apparent, with GM food being least acceptable and disease detection the most acceptable, while medical and pharmaceutical applications remained in favour. However, when this is compared with the results from 1996, there has been a noticeable decline in the popularity of biotechnology applications generally, suggesting that people are becoming more critical. Respondents tended to expect the development and introduction of cloning and GM food (the two applications they were asked to comment on) to occur at a more gradual pace.

    111(a) This is in line with New Zealand research. The IBAC report (Mackay 2000) found that, in terms of perceived opportunities for biotechnology, medical advance was the most common response.

  116. Finally, the health risks and benefits from GM foods need consideration. Use of GM food could produce adverse health effects that may not be discernible for many years. Conversely, it could produce foods with greater nutritional value. The current arrangement under ANZFA is that food producers submit documented evidence of food-testing procedures and outcomes (IBAC 2000). Given the example of the way tobacco companies were selective in their presentation of evidence about their product, this system appears woefully inadequate. In order to avoid the risk of regulatory agencies being deceived or unduly influenced by major corporations, there is a need to empower these agencies to go beyond merely assessing submitted supporting evidence. One solution would be to provide regulatory agencies with an investigative capacity.

    Nutriceuticals

  117. The possible development of nutriceuticals using GM technologies also needs addressing. For example, efforts have been under way to modify some fruits so that they act as vaccines. Such dramatic modifications of the food supply need to be treated with the utmost caution, and any product like this must be treated as a pharmaceutical - not a food. In other words, the fruit has become a delivery mechanism for a medicinal agent.
  118. In addition, as any medication has side effects or adverse reactions, these must be anticipated in the case of nutriceuticals. Nutriceuticals using GM technologies must not be allowed to be released into the general food supply, but must be prescribed so that only those who are appropriately trained can look for contraindications to the medical treatment and act accordingly. Regulatory mechanisms will have to be reviewed in order to deal with this situation (IBAC 2000: 15).

    B (j)(ii)

    Environmental matters

  119. Products of GM research have tremendous potential consequences for the welfare of the ecosystem. The overwhelming majority of the world's population continues to rely on agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry and fisheries as the main sources of their income. The rapid population growth in the Third World is likely to intensify such activities and the rate of resource extraction from our ecosystem.
  120. In the last two decades biological scientists (for example, Carroll et al. 1990; Holden et al. 1993; Matson et al. 1997; Soule and Piper 1992) have warned of a rapid degradation of agro-ecosystems from soil erosion, water pollution and the loss of genetic diversity, induced by the blind application of science and technology to the modernisation of agrifood production. For example, Soule et al. (1990) point out that 80 to 90 percent of the world's calories are provided by only 10 to 20 crops and less than 10 animal species. They further note that in the US only six cultivars occupied 42 percent of the soybean crop, 43 percent of hybrid corn, and 38 percent of wheat acreage in 1980.
  121. From this perspective, GM technology seems no different from any previous agrifood technologies that led to decline in the health of ecosystems. This is largely because the institutional arrangements through which GM technology is developed and introduced are no different from those that accelerated capital-intensive agrifood production (Kenney and Buttel 1985; Sorj and Wilkinson 1985; Barlow 1988; Molnar and Kinnucan 1989; Buttel 1990; Lappe and Collins 1988; Lappe and Bailey 1998). As shown recently by rural sociologists (for example, Juska et al. 1997a, b), the `technology-fix' model ignores the fact that common pest and disease problems which new technology (including GMOs) tries to fix are often the result of particular sets of social, natural, and technical relationships - what Perrow (1984) calls `normal accidents' in agrifood production.
  122. To reduce the risk of such accidents, as Juska et al. (1997b) argue, more proactive agro-ecosystems are needed. This may be achieved by developing and modifying legal frameworks for plant variety protection, farming practices (for example, rotations, multi-lines, integrated pest management) and organisations to emphasise greater variability rather than distinctiveness and homogeneity.
  123. The most comprehensive evaluation of this kind of approach to achieving better economic and environmental outcomes for Third World producers has been conducted by Pretty (1999). This work reviews over 300 examples of `sustainable' development strategies, and concludes that in the absence of GM technologies even modest deployment of more institutionally appropriate sustainability strategies had an extremely positive impact on productivity levels and environmental outcomes: what is needed is good management, not advanced technology. Pretty concludes that even though GM technologies might provide benefits for development strategies, they are currently institutionally configured in inappropriate ways, and are already being outperformed by less costly technologies.

    B (j)(iii)

    Economic matters

  124. Given the lack of actual GMOs in primary production, it is currently impossible to assess the market performance of real goods. This is critical, in the light of the widely varying claims about possible economic performance of products produced using GM technologies. A trade model is being developed at Lincoln University to determine the implications for New Zealand's strategies in overseas markets. Provisional simulations from the model (see Saunders et al. 2000) include the base scenario, the impact of a 20 percent price premium for GM-free food, a large shift in preference in Japan and the EU away from GM food, and a 10 percent reduction in producer costs of GM technologies.
  125. These four scenarios have been simulated against different assumptions regarding the proportion of GM to GM-free food produced in the countries modelled. These assumptions are: (a) GM to GM-free proportions will remain similar to the present level; or (b) there will be an increase in the projected amount of GM food being produced to 75 percent in the US and Canada, 20 percent in New Zealand, and 26 percent in Australia (in line with current estimates of the proportions of farmers who are likely to convert to GM production). While many more scenarios need to be constructed to enable sound interpretation of this modelling, preliminary findings suggest that economic returns in the trial scenarios would not be favourable to New Zealand.
  126. In New Zealand, a considerable body of research has been conducted on the emergence of alternative agricultural strategies in food export industries, and in the alternative agricultural movement generally. These are important for understanding the situation of GM food, as this social movement and related industries have provided an important base of resistance to the release of GMOs into agricultural production. In New Zealand, for example, organic agriculture has recently expanded rapidly, earning NZ$60 million from exports (Campbell 2000 a; Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000). Combining all forms of `environmentally enhanced' agriculture, we get a figure of just under NZ$1 billion in 2000 exports (Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000).
  127. This represents a significant shift in the export strategy of the horticultural sector (though the pastoral industries have not yet seen such a shift). Most industries participating in these novel forms of crop management report a combination of market demand and potential regulatory sanctions (green protectionism) as forcing such industries towards alternative production systems (Campbell and Fairweather 1998).

    Section B (k)

    B (k) the key strategic issues drawing on ethical, cultural, environmental, social, and economic risks and benefits arising from the use of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products

    Section B (k) Summary

  128. The key strategic issues discussed below are:
    • the economic risks to New Zealand of using GMOs in land-based food production
    • the characteristics of the global marketplace affecting New Zealand
    • increasingly negative consumer reactions to GM foods
    • the effects of international trading politics, including `green protectionism'
    • pharmaceutical development of products from GM technologies.
  129. The conclusion is that there may be little to lose economically and much to gain from a moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs in land-based production.

    B (k)

    Economic risks

  130. The current body of research on the economics of deploying GMOs in the land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals suggests that there are several strategic issues that reinforce the economic risks (see CSAFE 2000). These relate to New Zealand's positioning in the global market, the possible longevity of consumer concerns over GMOs, and trade developments.
  131. The projected development of new GM products that engender a higher willingness to pay for benefits alters the economic risks around GM deployment. Current research at Lincoln University is investigating the complex costs and benefits of reducing production costs and increasing product appeal, against potential market sanctions and negative retailer strategies and market responses (see Saunders et al. 2000). Preliminary results suggest that we cannot assume that increased consumer `benefits' will necessarily lead to a turnaround in the current negative market prospects of the GM food sector.

    The global market

  132. The global market for food is currently splitting, with bulk commodities providing inputs to processed foods, while niche retail markets are increasingly auditing and demarcating product lines. It is unlikely that the valuable niche markets for food will open to GM product lines in the medium term. The prospects for GM food exports seem more viable in the lower-value bulk commodity trade.
  133. This has potentially important implications for the future development and growth of New Zealand. New Zealand currently relies heavily on the exports of primary products, which accounted for 70 per cent of exports last year (MFAT 2000). However, as is well known, the terms of trade for primary products have been, on average, falling in real terms since the 1950s. This reflects the fact that as incomes rise internationally, the proportion spent on food falls, in particular, the proportion of expenditure that returns to the actual farm producer.
  134. Also, as incomes rise the attributes of food become more important in maintaining both market access and value. These attributes, which are growing in importance, include food safety and quality as well as indirect attributes such as animal welfare and the environmental consequences of food production. This has already been the case with New Zealand in maintaining its access into high-value markets such as Japan and the UK, where buyers are concerned with traceability and ensuring producers meet their requirements in terms of production standards as well as quality. Clearly, maintaining access into these markets might be compromised by a GMO-based food-exporting strategy.

    Consumer reaction

  135. Consumer reaction to GM foods is becoming increasingly negative (Cook et al. 2000 a; Kamaldeen and Powell 2000; INRA (Europe)-ECOSA 2000; Norton 1998). This reaction is best characterised as a `food scare' (CSAFE 2000; Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000) around GM foods (Almas 1999; Gofton and Haimes 1999). This scare is increasing in its momentum and is in the process of becoming `locked in' through various social and legislative processes (see CSAFE 2000 for a detailed discussion of this mechanism). This suggests poor market prospects for GM foods in the short to medium term.

    International trading politics

  136. GM foods have become incorporated into wider political agendas, particularly the emergence of `green protectionism' in the EU and Japan (Campbell and Coombes 1999; Campbell and Fitzgerald 2000; Campbell, 2000a). Increasingly, markets like the EU and Japan are being protected through a raft of food safety and environmental criteria, legitimised through the `precautionary principle'. This is occurring alongside EU attempts to reposition the subsidisation of agriculture to include environmental outcomes (Saunders 2000a, b, c, d). The political forces behind moratoria and sanctions against GM products are unlikely to dissipate soon.

    Pharmaceuticals

  137. The pharmaceutical development of products from GM technologies will obey a different economic logic due to the globally integrated nature of the pharmaceutical industry and the likelihood that innovations in this sector in New Zealand are most likely to create economic value for a global shareholding (just as New Zealand shareholders can participate in the wealth-creating activities of non-New Zealand pharmaceutical companies).

    134(a). These arguments suggest that New Zealand could stand to lose little economic benefit and may actually gain advantage by imposing a moratorium on the commercial release of GMOs in land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals. This position is echoed in Australia by Foster (2000).

    Section B (l)

    B (l) the international implications, in relation to both New Zealand's binding international obligations and New Zealand's foreign and trade policy, of any measures that New Zealand might take with regard to genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products, including the costs and risks associated with particular options

    Section B (l) Summary

  138. If New Zealand were to erect trade barriers against GM products, as has happened in Japan and the European Union, this may undermine the World Trade Organization's attempts to reduce Technical Barriers to Trade. But given the direction of consumer reaction, to continue with a cautious approach may be the best option.
  139. New Zealand still needs to be able to undertake international-standard risk assessments (health and environmental), which means retaining the technical capability for GM research.
  140. The claim that GMOs can conserve the ecosystem needs to be examined carefully, and New Zealand should be wary of exploiting the genetic materials of flora and fauna from other countries, thus undermining its commitment to maintaining global biodiversity.

    B (l)

    The international implications of New Zealand GM measures

  141. Initiatives for the ethical regulation of companies need to occur at both the national and international level. Governments need to lobby for structures that would ensure that companies who are de-registered in one country cannot simply export their operations to another country without prohibitively severe penalties. International organisations can also act as a clearing house for information, and should take a lead in developing guidelines and protocols.
  142. The development of international initiatives on climate change could be a model for this. New Zealand has taken a leading role on the international stage on climate change, and it could also take on this role for GM. This requirement to look to international regulation is intensified by the existence of the World Trade Organization and international agreements such as Technical Barriers to Trade.

    The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TBT)

  143. The current trade barriers erected against GM food in Europe and Japan and the moratorium in New Zealand are indicators that the potential introduction of restrictive legislation around the GM technology may not be as far fetched an idea as it would have seemed only a year ago. On the one hand, these nation-based measures may undermine the WTO platform that aims to harmonise product standards as a means to reduce TBT. However, it is not unlikely that the majority of member countries in the First World, including the US, may establish equally restrictive regulations against GM food if public attitudes against the technology (shown in the Eurobarometer survey) continue to rise. Therefore, New Zealand should continue with the current cautionary approach to GMOs.

    The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS)

  144. Any risk assessments of GMO products (whether medical or agrifood) for environmental and food safety performed in New Zealand need to be equivalent to those performed elsewhere. This means that even if New Zealand chooses restrictive measures against GM food products, the nation needs to maintain the technical capability for GM research.

    The UN Convention of Biological Diversity

  145. The claim that GMOs would benefit the effort to protect the environment and conserve the ecosystem requires more public scrutiny. The scientific community, both in New Zealand and abroad, seems to be divided on the topic. Any threat to the nation's unique biological diversity may also threaten the national and cultural identity of our people. Moreover, the use of GMOs produced from the exploitation of genetic materials from flora or fauna extracted from a Third World country would undermine New Zealand's commitment to the protection of biological diversity worldwide.

    Section B (m)

    B (m) the range of strategic outcomes for the future application or avoidance of genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand

    Section B (m) Summary

  146. Because the short-term economic prospects for using GMOs in land-based food, fibre and neutriceutical production are poor, New Zealand may benefit from a moratorium on such activities. It could then use this time productively by (a) closely monitoring the success or otherwise of GM production in other countries, and (b) developing ways by which diverse groups of people (for example, research scientists, farmers, medical researchers, health practitioners, environmentalists, and other consumers) could be regularly brought together to share their concerns and incorporate those concerns into their own activities. This can be achieved in three areas: research, regulation, and mass communication.

    B (m)

    The range of strategic outcomes

  147. Recent economic analysis (Saunders 2000 a, Saunders 2000 c, Saunders et al 2000) of the potential deployment of GMOs in commercial land-based production of food, fibre and nutriceuticals, suggests that there could be potential benefits if New Zealand delays a decision on commercial release (see CSAFE 2000). The first wave of GM food products are performing very poorly in global markets and are unlikely to improve in the medium term. The development trajectory of commercial quantities of potentially consumer-friendly GM products will take many years (and are still not certain to deliver strong economic benefits).
  148. A moratorium on commercial release in food, fibre and nutriceuticals would enable a more coherent economic picture of global markets to be compiled. At the same time, other countries would bear the economic and environmental risks of broad release of GMOs during a time when New Zealand would not forfeit any economic advantages. The most likely sector to suffer economic constraints through such a moratorium would be the science sector associated with providing technology to land-based production.
  149. During such a moratorium, a fruitful approach to addressing scientific and moral uncertainty in GM uses would be to create institutional mechanisms by which diverse groups of people (for example, research scientists, farmers, medical researchers, health practitioners, environmentalists, consumers) could be regularly brought together to share their concerns and incorporate those concerns into their own activities. This can be achieved in three areas: research, regulation, and mass communication.

    Research

  150. Research institutions need to increase public involvement in the research process. As is often done in the land-grant universities in the US, advisory councils for major research initiatives and programmes may be useful for achieving this goal. Such councils would include representatives from local organisations and would examine moral and ethical concerns associated with those projects.

    Regulation

  151. The existing public consultation mechanisms do not seem effective in encouraging New Zealand people to participate in the decision-making process. Within the last few years New Zealand government authorities have dramatically reduced the number of government reports published in printed copies. Instead, electronic copies are made available for citizens without charge. This has helped social scientists to get access to various government documents, but may have discouraged citizens from participating in the decision-making process. Although the call for public submissions should be continued before any regulatory and policy changes are made, we are not convinced about their effectiveness in shaping those changes: it requires a considerable amount of energy and time to prepare a submission.

    Media

  152. Government authorities and research institutions involved in the development of GM tend to release information about their activities after a major event takes place. A more pro-active use of the mass media and public consultation rather than didactic instruction is needed :
    • Media organisations should improve their capacity to communicate technical matters.
    • Scientists should improve their capacity to communicate technical matters in a language laypeople can understand, and should increase their involvement in the media reporting process.
    • Government authorities should release plans for a regulatory change and use the media as a tool to call for public involvement.
    • Some type of regular forum among government authorities, research institutions (for example, Crown Research Institutes, universities, medical schools) and media organisations (for example, TV, radio, newspapers, magazines) should be created at which they share information on the GM issue.
  153. It is worth noting that while many scientists have criticised the media for `creating' the GM situation, recent research by Sivak et al. (forthcoming 2000) suggests that the English-language media have been very even-handed in their treatment of GM, and prior to 1997 usually promoted the technology without significant reservation. This suggests that there are good grounds for developing a better science-media rapport.

    Section B (n)

    B (n) whether the statutory and regulatory processes controlling genetic modification, genetically modified organisms, and products in New Zealand are adequate to address the strategic outcomes that, in your opinion, are desirable, and whether any legislative, regulatory, policy, or other changes are needed to enable New Zealand to achieve these outcomes

    Section B (n) Summary

  154. The recommended legislative, regulatory and policy initiatives discussed below focus on the need to:
    • consider the pros and cons of delaying the commercial release of GMOs in food, fibre and nutriceutical production by land-based industries
    • increase Public Good Science Funding for the evaluation of the socioeconomic impact of commercial production of GMOs and the facilitation of consultation with key stakeholders (for example, scientists, producers, marketers, Maori and consumer groups)
    • establish regulations to deal with the development and distribution of nutriceuticals
    • consider the decentralisation of some components of decision-making processes and monitoring procedures so that local communities have a sense of control over GM.
    • encourage the establishment of international agencies and international agreements in relation to biotechnology generally.
    • ensure responsible and ethical behaviour on the part of producers and researchers
    • encourage community participation in decision-making.

    B (n)

    Suggestions for statutory, regulatory and policy changes

  155. The issue of responsible and ethical behaviour is one that needs to be addressed. An IBAC study found that many respondents wanted the development of moral and ethical leadership and debate in the arena of biotechnology, and argued that a legal and regulatory framework for biotechnology was required (Mackay 2000: 3). Rose (2000) sums up the concerns over ethics in relation to biotechnological developments:

    The ethics committees, regulatory bodies and the like that try to place the unholy alliance of capitalism, science and professional entrepreneurship under a mandate of prudence and to steer them in the direction of humanity have limited purchase on these events.

  156. The Royal Commission provides an opportunity to consider regulatory frameworks. Regulations and legislation should occur at both the national and international level. In the IBAC report respondents criticised ERMA for lacking teeth, or for being overly pro-business. As it stands, ERMA is empowered to ensure that GMOs released into the environment do not have significant adverse effects on ecosystems or people. Under the HSNO Act territorial authorities are enforcement agencies. The Ministry of Health acts as an enforcement agency where there are issues of public health.
  157. Careful consideration needs to be given to whether territorial authorities are in the best position to oversee research on GM in the agricultural area when commercial interests may influence the process. This has become a general problem in New Zealand, where much contestable funding is `outcome-focused', so that even Crown Research Institutes are influenced by a commercial imperative (IBAC 2000: 11). This issue leads to a wider concern about the appropriate funding of research in New Zealand, which will not be addressed here.
  158. As discussed under Section B(Ji), there need to be appropriate measures put in place to ensure that nutriceuticals are treated as delivery mechanisms for medicines. Legislation relating to prescription medicines needs to incorporate nutriceuticals.
  159. Developing institutional forms to try to deal with the ethical and compensatory issues relating to new technologies such as GM will not guarantee public acceptability. Research on risk perception has noted a gulf between expert views and those of the public. Kunreuther and Slovic (1996: 121) note that:

    The public has a broad conception of risk, qualitative and complex, that incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic potential, controllability, equity, risk to future generations, and so forth into the risk equation. In contrast, experts' perceptions of risk are not closely related to these dimensions or the characteristics that underlie them. Instead, studies show that experts tend to see riskiness as synonymous with expected annual mortality...

  160. Although the issue of `dread' cannot be dealt with by developing new institutional arrangements, or modifying existing ones, the issue of control can to some extent be built into these. Mechanisms for enhancing the public participation in decision-making would be one way of doing this. Allowing decision-making to take place at the local level instead of centralised in agencies like ERMA could be another way of empowering the community and providing them with a degree of control.
  161. One argument against the sort of intensive regulation and legislation being promoted here is that it will infringe on the individual liberties of, say, farmers who want to gain a competitive advantage by using GM products. However, given the `unknowns' surrounding GM, it seems only just that those who are not gaining financially from the products must be protected from any possible adverse events.
  162. As a small nation, New Zealand can do little to influence world events on its own, and biotechnological development is an international issue. In this light New Zealand should take a leading role in lobbying for the establishment of an international agency that can deal with more global issues, such has occurred with climate change.

    Summary of recommendations for statutory and regulatory processes

    • Consider the pros and cons of delaying the commercial release of GMOs in food, fibre and nutriceutical production by land-based industries.
    • Increase Public Good Science Funding for the evaluation of the socioeconomic impact of commercial production of GMOs and the facilitation of consultation with key stakeholders (for example, scientists, producers, marketers, Maori and other consumer groups).
    • Establish regulations to deal with the development and distribution of nutriceuticals.
    • Consider the decentralisation of some components of decision-making processes and monitoring procedures so that local communities have more control over the decision-making surrounding possible GM applications.
    • Encourage the establishment of international agencies and international agreements in relation to biotechnology generally.
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